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Stand on Same-Sex Marriage
Perhaps he’s your neighbor.  Or your best friend.  Perhapsshe’s your senator, or your co-worker, or your PTA presi-
dent.  Perhaps they’re unknown souls with untold stories, flicker-
ing and fleeting images lost in the blur of faces you encounter
every day: the grocery clerk, the bank teller, the mailman, the
stranger holding a door.
Perhaps you haven’t noticed.  Or perhaps you have.  Perhaps
he’s your child, or your beer league softball buddy, or your pas-
tor.  Perhaps she’s your sister.
Perhaps she’s you.
This much is certain: Oregon voters passed Measure 36 in the
November 2004 general election, amending the state constitu-
tion1 to prohibit same-sex marriage in Oregon and foreclosing
one avenue of legal attack upon state machinery that openly and
explicitly disadvantages homosexual individuals.  More precisely,
the voters of Oregon definitively chose to refuse thousands of
their fellow citizens the basic, intimate, and cherished choice of
* J.D. Candidate, University of Oregon School of Law, 2006.  Editor-in-Chief, Or-
egon Law Review , 2005-06.  Thanks to Audrey Kristine for your steadfast support,
insight, and humor.  Thanks also to Joe Torregrossa for your advice and counsel, to
Professor Garrett Epps for the guidance and encouragement, to my mother and fa-
ther, and to my three stars:  Rachel Errin, Elizabeth Michelle, and Abigail Judith.
1 Measure 36 adds a single sentence to the Oregon Constitution:  “It is the policy
of Oregon, and its political subdivisions, that only a marriage between one man and
one woman shall be valid or legally recognized as a marriage.” OREGON OFFICE OF
THE SEC’Y OF STATE, VOTERS’ PAMPHLET VOL. 1, at 77 (2004), available at http://
www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/pdf/vpvol1.pdf.
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marrying the person they love.  Perhaps your free will to marry
still includes a free choice to marry.  Perhaps it does not.  It is
true that Measure 36 does not strip anyone absolutely of the
choice to marry.  However, this Comment argues that the choice
to marry is coextensive with the choice to marry the person of
one’s choosing.  As such, Measure 36 effectively deprives gay
men and lesbians of the choice to marry as a matter of state con-
stitutional law.
That deprivation became a binding rule of Oregon constitu-
tional law as part of a convulsive policy movement that gathered
momentum through the run-up to the 2004 elections, and an-
nounced its arrival in eleven states across the country once the
ballots were counted.  In addition to Oregon, voters in Arkansas,
Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Da-
kota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah amended their state constitu-
tions in November 2004 to prohibit same-sex marriage.2  This
flurry of rewriting foundational documents brings the number of
states that have constitutionally enshrined bans on same-sex mar-
riage to fifteen,3 and further crystallizes a legal debate—first
emerging in the 1970s4—that will eventually demand a definitive
2 See  James Dao, Same-Sex Marriage Issue Key to Some G.O.P. Races , N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at A4 (noting the correlation between inclusion of same-sex
marriage prohibitions on the ballot and an increased turnout by socially conservative
voters); see also id.  (noting that the constitutional amendments received at least
sixty percent of the vote in every state besides Oregon and Michigan).  Measure 36
garnered roughly 56.6% of the 1,816,102 votes counted in Oregon and received ma-
jority support in thirty-four of Oregon’s thirty-six counties, failing to carry the vote
in Benton County and Multnomah County. See OREGON OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF
STATE, GENERAL ELECTION ABSTRACT OF VOTES, STATE MEASURE NO. 36 (2004),
available at  http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/ nov22004/abstract/m36.pdf.
3 See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (“To be valid or recognized in this State, a mar-
riage may exist only between one man and one woman.”); MO. CONST. art. I,  § 33
(“That to be valid and recognized in this state, a marriage shall exist only between a
man and a woman.”); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21 (“Only a marriage between a male
and female person shall be recognized and given effect in this state.”).  Hawaii’s
constitution does not specifically prohibit same-sex marriage, but reserves to the
legislature the power to define marriage as existing solely between opposite-sex
couples. See HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.  The Nebraska constitutional prohibition of
same-sex marriage, adopted in 2000, was recently invalidated by a federal district
court on First Amendment, Equal Protection, and Bill of Attainder Clause grounds.
See  Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb.
2005).
4 See, e.g. , Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (rejecting
lesbian couple’s challenge to state marriage statutes); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d
185, 189 (Minn. 1971) (denying due process and equal protection challenge to statu-
tory same-sex marriage prohibition).
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answer from the United States Supreme Court.5  Yet while help-
ing sharpen the issue on a national scale, Measure 36 simultane-
ously cast large shadows of doubt upon a question which the
Oregon Supreme Court once seemed poised to answer.  Based in
large part on county counsel’s opinion that Oregon’s marriage
statutes, when construed so as to permit marriage solely between
a man and a woman, were inconsistent with the state constitu-
tion’s privileges and immunities clause,6 Multnomah County be-
gan issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples in March
2004.7  When the state registrar refused to file and register those
licenses because Oregon’s marriage statutes prohibit same-sex
marriage,8 nine same-sex couples brought suit in April 2004 chal-
lenging the statutes under the Oregon Constitution.9  Identifying
the central issue in the case as involving access to benefits, rather
than the right to marry, the trial court held that Oregon’s mar-
riage statutes impermissibly withheld the substantive benefits of
marriage from same-sex couples.10
Despite a fast-track appellate process that bypassed the inter-
mediate Oregon Court of Appeals entirely,11 the Oregon Su-
preme Court never got the chance to pass on the Li plaintiffs’
5 See generally  Pamela S. Katz, The Case For Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Mar-
riage , 8 J.L. & POL’Y 61, 61 (1999) (arguing that the inconsistencies inherent in a
state-by-state patchwork approach to same-sex marriage create “instability, uncer-
tainty and chaos, conditions which are unacceptable in a nation where due process
and liberty are paramount values”).
6 See Stipulated Facts, Ex. 2 at 1-2, Li v. Oregon, Civil No. 0403-03057 (Cir. Ct.
Multnomah County, Or., Apr. 20, 2004) (memorandum prepared by the Multnomah
County Attorney’s Office advising that refusing to grant marriage licenses to same-
sex couples violated article I, section 20 of the Oregon Constitution, which provides
that “[n]o law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or
immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens”).
7 See Li , Civil No. 0403-03057, at 2.
8 See OR. REV. STAT. § 106.010 (2003) (“Marriage is a civil contract entered into
in person by males at least 17 years of age and females at least 17 years of age, who
are otherwise capable, and solemnized in accordance with ORS 106.150.”).  While
the language of the statute does not expressly limit marriage to between a man and a
woman, “other provisions in ORS Chapter 106 demonstrate that this is the inten-
tion.  For instance, ORS 106.041 provides that pursuant to ORS 106.120, persons or
religious organizations can ‘join together as husband and wife the persons named in
the license.’” Li , Civil No. 0403-03057, at 6.
9 See  First Amended Complaint at 28, Li , Civil No. 0403-03057 (arguing that fail-
ing to allow same-sex couples to marry is an unjustified denial of a privilege in viola-
tion of article I, section 20 of the Oregon Constitution).
10 Li , Civil No. 0403-03057, at 11, 15.
11 See Li v. Oregon, 338 Or. 376, 383, 110 P.3d 91, 94 (2005) (noting that after the
State appealed the trial court’s disposition, the court of appeals certified the appeal
directly to the Oregon Supreme Court).
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claim that they were entitled to the right to marry in order to
access the benefits withheld them in violation of the state consti-
tution.  Rather, after the passage of Measure 36 in November
2004 and the certification of the election a month later, the court
solicited supplemental briefing on Measure 36’s impact on the
issues raised in the Li  litigation12 and heard oral argument in
December 2004.13  Several months later, the court issued an
opinion rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that Measure 36 is
merely a statement of aspirational principle, holding instead that
it is an operative principle of Oregon constitutional law.14  That
determination necessarily snuffed any claim that the plaintiff
couples who had not obtained a marriage license had any right to
one under the Oregon Constitution,15 for a statutory scheme pro-
spectively prohibiting same-sex marriage cannot, by definition,
run afoul of a state constitution that does precisely the same.16
While that proposition seems straightforward enough, the pic-
ture is muddled by the fact that Measure 36, already a source of
impassioned division among many in this state, has been chal-
lenged separately in state court.  On the last day of January 2005,
Basic Rights Oregon filed suit arguing that Measure 36 is proce-
durally unconstitutional.17  Whether this suit will be successful,
12 Id.  at 388, 110 P.3d at 97.
13 See generally  Bill Bishop, Gay Marriages Rest with Justices , REGISTER-GUARD
(Eugene, Or.), Dec. 16, 2004, at A1.
14 Li , 338 Or. at 390, 110 P.3d at 98 (“Today, marriage in Oregon – an institution
once limited to opposite-sex couples only by statute – now is so limited by the state
constitution as well . . . . Measure 36 resolves any prospective claims that plaintiffs
may have had under Article I, section 20 , to obtain marriage licenses.  The claims of
the five same-sex couples that they are entitled as a matter of state law, now or
hereafter, to obtain marriage licenses and to marry thus fail.”).
15 See id. at 390, 110 P.3d at 98.
16 The Court further held that the approximately 3000 marriage licenses issued by
Multnomah County were void ab initio  because the state legislature has exclusive
authority to regulate marriage. Id. at 391-92, 110 P.3d at 99-100.  Finally, it should
be noted that the Li  court did not address this Comment’s basic assertion that prohi-
bition of same-sex marriage, whether by state constitutional amendment or statutory
scheme, violates the Federal Constitution. See Id. at 391 n.11, 110 P.3d at 99 n.11
(refusing to address the claim that Oregon’s marriage statutes violate the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution because the issue was not raised in
the trial court).
17 See  Complaint at 6-8, Martinez v. Kulongoski, Civil No. OSC-11023 (Cir. Ct.
Marion County, Or., filed Jan. 29, 2005) (arguing that Measure 36 is so broad it
constitutes a revision rather than an amendment to the constitution, and only the
legislature has the power to revise the constitution; that Measure 36 affects at least
eleven constitutional rights and failing to vote on each change individually violates
the single-subject rule; and that Measure 36 constitutes an expression of policy,
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and whether the Oregon Supreme Court might ultimately hold
Measure 36 procedurally invalid and touch off another blitz to
the voting booth, are matters of conjecture.  But despite the
shroud of uncertainty encircling much of the discussion, the cen-
tral issue lying at the heart of Measure 36 remains clear: homo-
sexual individuals in Oregon are being deprived of the
fundamental right to choose marriage on no basis other than the
sexual identity of those individuals’ partners.
While directly imposed upon a numerical minority of individu-
als in the state,18 such deprivation transcends all demographic
lines and socioeconomic classifications.  The immediate burden
of Measure 36 is borne by individuals at all points in the social
spectrum who happen to share one trait: a desire to marry some-
one of the same sex.  Its derivative impact, though, reaches much
further.  Many in this state feel Measure 36’s sting vicariously, as
suggested above.  Even those who do not are not exempt from its
reverberations.  The passage of Measure 36 affects each of us,
implicating fundamental notions of liberty and equality, and call-
ing into question the extent to which the State may justly order
the decisions and affairs of its citizens.
This Comment makes the case that Measure 36 and laws of its
ilk are impermissible violations of fundamental principles lying at
the heart of our federal constitutional structure and its jurispru-
dence.  Initially, the Comment considers the evolution of the Su-
preme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence and its
protection of certain fundamental personal liberties, including
the right to choose marriage.  The Comment next examines the
protection substantive due process has provided to the funda-
mental right to marry in other nontraditional contexts, and ar-
gues that enunciating the right of homosexual individuals to
marry the person of their choice is a necessary and logical recog-
nition of an existing fundamental right.  The Comment then con-
siders the methodology and implications of recent cases
which is not permitted by the initiative power granted by the constitution to enact
laws and amendments).
18 Census 2000 counted Oregon’s population at 3,421,399 people and reported
1,333,723 households in the state.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 TABLE
DP-1: OREGON (2001), available at  http://censtats.census.gov/data/OR/04041.pdf.
Gay couples comprised 8932 of those households. See DAVID M. SMITH & GARY J.
GATES, GAY AND LESBIAN FAMILIES IN THE UNITED STATES: SAME-SEX UNMAR-
RIED PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS 4 (2001), available at  http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/1000491_gl_partner_households.pdf.
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extending the unfettered right to marry to homosexual individu-
als.  Finally, the Comment examines and dispenses with the most
prevalent arguments opposing same-sex marriage, revealing a
bankrupt moralism that can—and should—no longer wield the
mallet of deprivation and disassociation to deny homosexual in-
dividuals the fundamental, constitutionally protected right to
marry the person of their choice.
Although Measure 36 certainly implicates substantial equal
protection questions,19 those are not addressed here.  Rather, the
19 In recent years, courts in several states have examined same-sex marriage cases
under an equal protection analysis—or the substantial equivalent determined by the
specific state constitution. See, e.g. , Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-
95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (under state
constitution’s equal protection clause, prohibition on same-sex marriage is sex-based
classification subject to heightened scrutiny); Standhart v. Super. Ct., 77 P.3d 451,
464-65 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (applying rational basis standard to reject challenge to
prohibition on same-sex marriage under state constitution’s equal protection
clause); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59-60 (Haw. 1993) (holding that denying mar-
riage license to applicants solely on the ground that they are of the same sex violates
state constitution’s equal protection clause unless the State satisfies strict scrutiny by
showing the law is narrowly drawn to further compelling state interest); Morrison v.
Sadler, No. 49A02-0305-CV-447, 2005 Ind. App. LEXIS 75, at *41 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005) (holding under rational basis review that prohibition of same-sex marriage
does not violate state constitution’s equal privileges and immunities clause);  Good-
ridge v. Dep’t of Mental Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) (stating that pro-
hibition of same-sex marriage fails rational basis test under state constitution’s equal
protection clause); Lewis v. Harris, No. MER-L-15-03, slip op. at 56-58 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. Nov. 5, 2003) (denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples does not
violate state constitution’s equal protection provisions); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d
864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (holding that excluding same-sex couples from benefits and pro-
tections of marriage violated state constitution’s common benefits clause).  The leg-
islative response to the courts in these states has varied.  For example, the holdings
in Brause  and Baher  were overridden by subsequent statewide referenda that
amended both states’ constitutions. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (“To be valid or
recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only between one man and one wo-
man.”); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“The legislature shall have the power to reserve
marriage to opposite-sex couples.”).  The Hawaii Legislature has since adopted a
domestic partnership law granting rights that include survivorship, inheritance, and
property rights. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C (Supp. 2003).  On the heels of the court’s
decision in Baker , the Vermont Legislature passed, and Governor Howard Dean
signed, a law permitting same-sex couples to enter into “civil unions” providing ben-
efits and rights virtually identical to those provided in marriage. See Carey
Goldberg, Vermont Gives Final Approval to Same-Sex Unions , N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
2000, at A14.  Finally, substantial recent commentary regarding equal protection and
same-sex marriage has been generated in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Lawrence v. Texas , 539 U.S. 558 (2003), striking down a ban on same-sex sexual
acts, and particularly Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion relying on equal protec-
tion analysis to find the law unconstitutional.  While an exhaustive cataloging is not
possible here, the following articles are representative:  William C. Duncan, The Lit-
igation to Redefine Marriage:  Equality and Social Meaning , 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 623
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emphasis that substantive due process jurisprudence places upon
the constitutional right of personal autonomy, which includes the
fundamental right to marry, makes that doctrine an especially
compelling framework under which to analyze the constitutional
implications of Measure 36.
I
PUBLIC LICENSING OF THE MOST PRIVATE UNION:
WHY DOES THE STATE HAVE A STAKE
IN MARRIAGE?
At the midpoint of the first decade in the new millennium, it
can no longer be genuinely disputed that gay men and lesbians
permeate every level, angle, and station in American society.20
Homosexual individuals hold elected office, serve in the mili-
tary,21 and pay taxes.  They vote, send their children to school,
and contribute to their communities.  They fall in love and estab-
lish committed, long-term relationships.  Yet, despite the partici-
pation of homosexual individuals in nearly every facet of
American life and the indicia of citizenship in which they share,
state regimes forbidding the choice to establish a family through
civil marriage effectively subjugate gay men and lesbians in a
static position of second-class citizenship, denying full participa-
tion in our society.22  The explicit result is that homosexual indi-
(2004), Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: “The Fundamental Right” That Dare
Not Speak Its Name , 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004); Mark E. Wojcik, The Wedding
Bells Heard Around the World:  Years From Now, Will We Wonder Why We Worried
About Same-Sex Marriage? , 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 589 (2004).
20 See GARY GATES, GAY VETERANS TOP ONE MILLION 1 (2003) (noting recent
research that indicates four percent of U.S. adults are gay or lesbian) available at
http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=900642.  Census 2000 counted 209,128,094 Ameri-
can adults. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. SUMMARY: 2000, at 2 (2002) available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/c2kprof00-us.pdf.  Based upon Gates’ re-
search, then, the homosexual adult population in the United States counts roughly
8,365,124 individuals among its ranks.
21 This Comment does not address the efficacy or wisdom of the United States
military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy.  However, it is inconceivable that homosex-
ual individuals have neither previously served nor continue to do so.  Recent re-
search indicates that 683,000 of the 27.5 million veterans counted in Census 2000
(two percent) are gay men and 350,000 (one percent) are lesbians. See GATES,
supra  note 20, at 1.
22 The essential value judgment disapproving of same-sex relationships and mani-
fested in laws such as Measure 36 is not limited to a hollow condemnation of same-
sex individuals.  Rather, that value judgment imports numerous tangible ramifica-
tions.  In a report issued in January 2004, the United States General Accounting
Office (GAO) identified 1138 federal statutory provisions that confer benefits,
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viduals—while capable and licensed to teach in our schools,
worship in our churches, and practice medicine in our hospitals—
are prohibited from partaking of our most cherished social insti-
tution.23  The implicit message is that homosexual individuals,
despite broad participation in most other conceivable social con-
texts, are either unable or morally unfit to establish the most sa-
cred of bonds with a person of their choosing.
The ability of any State to deprive any individual of such a
deeply personal right has its foundations in the fact that mar-
riage, as both a common law institution and creature of statute, is
“an area which traditionally has been subject to pervasive state
regulation.”24  Such regulation has traditionally included restric-
tions on the age and degree of consanguinity of the parties, as
well as prohibitions of bigamy.25  Because the family has long
been the focal point26 of our social structure, state regulation of
the foundational component of family— marriage between two
committed adults—inheres in our legal tradition.  That this has
been and continues to be the state of play makes sense.  Simply
put, the State has an important interest in promoting both a sta-
ble society and an environment where individuals are equipped
with the tools to seek happiness.  The critical role of the family in
rights, and privileges conditioned upon marital status.  The report updated a GAO
compilation issued in 1997, in connection with the enactment of the Defense of Mar-
riage Act (DOMA), which identified 1049 federal laws conferring benefits, rights,
and privileges contingent upon marital status. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO-04-353R 1 (2004), available at  http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d04353r.pdf.
Between Sept. 21, 1996—the date DOMA was signed into law—and Dec. 31, 2003,
120 federal laws implicating marital status were enacted, and thirty-one were re-
pealed or amended such that marital status is no longer a factor. Id.  Non-exhaus-
tive research by the author indicates that over 400 Oregon state laws implicate
marital status, conferring rights, duties, and benefits on the basis of one’s status as a
“spouse.”
23 This is no longer the case in one of our fifty states.  Massachusetts began issuing
marriage licenses to same-sex couples in May 2004 after the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts’ landmark decision in Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).  The court not only held that statutory prohibition of same-
sex marriage and its attendant benefits violated the state constitution, it also ordered
full extension of marriage to same-sex couples as a matter of remedy. See infra  Part
IV.B for further discussion of Goodridge .
24 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 396 (Powell, J., concurring).
25 See id.  at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting the legitimacy of state prohibi-
tions on marriage by siblings, children, and those with a living spouse).
26 See  Bruce C. Hafen, Puberty, Privacy, and Protection: The Risks of Children’s
“Rights,”  63 A.B.A. J. 1383, 1383 (1977) (describing the “family tradition” as “such
an obvious presupposition of our culture that it has not been well articulated, let
alone explained or justified”).
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shaping each of us as individuals, as well as shaping the larger
society we share, gives the State both incentive and entitlement
to regulate the formation of family through the institution of
marriage.  As a result, the State may use age as a proxy to ensure
that individuals appreciate the gravity of the decision to marry.27
Likewise, the State may seek to discourage the very real genetic
problems that children of incestuous relationships face by
prohibiting marriage between closely related persons.28
Such regulations serve to protect a family structure that can be
seen as instrumental in at least two contexts.  In one regard, the
family unit operates on the individual level as a primary relation-
ship model, providing security, support, and reciprocal commit-
ment whereby the individual partakes of, and is responsible to,
something beyond him- or herself.29  The state interest in pro-
moting an environment in which individuals can thrive is thus
advanced by the formation of families.  This is so independent of
the sex of the spouses involved.30  The family also operates in a
broader context as the elemental unit by which we organize our
social relations, serving as a stabilizing agent for society at large
by promoting both accountability to and responsibility for
others.31  The state interest in promoting a stable society marked
by cooperative interdependence is thus served by the formation
of families.  This is likewise true regardless of the sexual identi-
ties of the spouses involved.32
There can be little question that homosexuals are as capable
and worthy as heterosexuals of enjoying the basic human rights
inherent in the concept of family—compassion, support, commit-
27 See, e.g. , OR. REV. STAT. § 106.010 (2003) (requiring that individuals be at least
seventeen before they may marry).
28 See, e.g., id.  § 106.020(2) (prohibiting marriage between those who are “first
cousins or any nearer of kin to each other, whether of the whole or half blood,
whether by blood or adoption, computing by the rules of the civil law, except that
when the parties are first cousins by adoption only, the marriage is not prohibited or
void”).
29 See infra  note 219 and accompanying text.
30 See  Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003); see
also infra  notes 213-216 and accompanying text.
31 See infra  sources cited note 34.
32 See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 964 (rejecting the argument that prohibiting
same-sex marriage is rationally related to ensuring an optimal setting for child rear-
ing, the court stated such prohibitions “will not make children of opposite-sex mar-
riages more secure, but it does prevent children of same-sex couples from enjoying
the immeasurable advantages that flow from the assurance of ‘a stable family struc-
ture in which children will be reared, educated, and socialized’”).
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ment, and protection.33  Yet despite an identity of capacity and
desire to share in those elemental human rights flowing from the
family, Measure 36 precludes homosexual individuals from ac-
cess through the most-basic means—the institution of marriage.34
No questions, no exceptions, no dice, as a matter of Oregon con-
stitutional law.  But apart from its stunting and subversive impact
on family units that fall outside the heterosexual-centric status
quo, the truly debilitative effect of Measure 36 takes place at the
individual level.
II
DOLLARS AND SENSATIONS:  THE TANGIBLE AND INTANGIBLE
PERSONAL BENEFITS OF MARRIAGE PROTECTED AS A MATTER
OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The tangible benefits and rights withheld from same-sex
couples and their children by Measure 36 are numerous and well-
known.  As of January 2004, more than 1100 federal laws condi-
tioned benefits, rights, and privileges on an individual’s marital
status.35  In Oregon, property transferal rights,36 medical care
rights and privileges,37 and standing to bring wrongful death ac-
tions38 are among the rights and privileges available with no
questions asked to married couples.  Those same valuable,
deeply personal rights and privileges are withheld without excep-
tion from individuals in same-sex relationships under a statutory
scheme—now backed by explicit constitutional mandate—that
forbids homosexuals from electing the status that confers those
33 See  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
34 See  Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (describing marriage as “the
relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society”); Maynard v. Hill,
125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (characterizing marriage as “the foundation of the family
and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress”).
35 See  discussion supra  note 22.
36 See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 112.025, 112.035, 114.105 (2003) (“surviving spouse” has
the right of intestate succession and may elect a statutory share of the deceased
spouse’s estate); id.  § 107.105 (upon dissolution of the marriage, a spouse may be
entitled to receive money from the other for spousal support).
37 See, e.g. , id.  § 441.605(14) (guaranteeing residents of health care facilities pri-
vacy for visits by the resident’s spouse, with no parallel provision for unmarried
partners, as part of the Nursing Home Patients’ Bill of Rights); id.  § 735.615(1)(c)
(the Oregon Medical Insurance Pool provides health insurance coverage to those
whose medical conditions do not allow them to obtain coverage in the private sector;
under the statute a medically eligible person’s spouse is also entitled to coverage).
38 See id.  § 30.020.
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rights.  However, tax breaks39 and economic advantages under
intestacy statutes,40 important as they are, are not what have
moved the Supreme Court time and again to proclaim the right
to marry a fundamentally guaranteed aspect of liberty protected
as a matter of substantive due process by the United States
Constitution.41
Rather, the choice of marriage is a fundamental right because
of its central role in the definition of self, in the ordering of one’s
private life, and in the personalized expression of one’s commit-
ment, affection, and love to another.  It is a fundamental right
because it is intimately and inextricably linked to the core of
one’s emotional, social, and spiritual identity.  It is a fundamental
right because the very nature of the association—a promise to
bind oneself exclusively to another—implicates a certain unas-
sailable liberty of the soul that while difficult to articulate is un-
questionably protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.42
39 Over 300 different sections of the Internal Revenue Code provide differential
tax treatment on the basis of marital status. See, e.g. , 26 U.S.C. § 32(b) (2000) (pro-
viding a higher phaseout amount for determining earned income child credit, which
essentially allows married couples to make more money before the earned income
credit is disallowed).
40 See  discussion supra  note 22.
41 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383
(1978) (describing the “freedom to marry” as a “fundamental liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause”); id.  at 384 (citing with approval cases establishing that
“the right to marry is part of the fundamental ‘right of privacy’ implicit in the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause”); Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431
U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (describing the right to personal privacy as including “the
interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions,” (quoting
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)) and stating that “it is clear that among
the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government interfer-
ence are personal decisions ‘relating to marriage [and] . . .  family relationships’”
(quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973)); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La-
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (“This Court has long recognized that freedom of
personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one
of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.”); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (characterizing marriage as “the
most important relation in life”).
42 A right to “liberty of the soul” is neither a term of art, nor a doctrine the Su-
preme Court has adopted, nor a phrase the Court appears to have ever used.  It is,
however, one formulation of the foundational principle that there is a certain point
past which the government may not infringe upon the personal liberty held by the
individual.  That principle has been expressed most commonly as a right to privacy
since the Court’s decision in Griswold v. Connecticut , 381 U.S. 479 (1965), striking
down a state law prohibiting the distribution or use of birth control devices to or by
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The Court made that determination in Loving v. Virginia,43 a
case in which it did not have to, by answering a question that it
did not need to reach.  Considering the constitutional validity of
a statutory scheme under which a white man and black woman
were convicted for the criminal act of marrying one another, the
Court first subjected Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statutes to an
equal protection inquiry.44  Rejecting the State’s argument that
the statutes at issue applied equally to blacks and whites by
prohibiting members of each race from marrying members of the
other,45 the Court struck down the prohibition on interracial
marriage as an arbitrary and invidious racial classification viola-
tive of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.46
That conclusion alone could have ended the matter.  It did not.
Rather than resting solely on the determination that Virginia’s
married couples.  Justice Douglas’ plurality opinion reflects the difficulties associ-
ated with articulating a right protected by the Constitution but not enumerated
therein, ultimately concluding that the explicit guarantees contained in the Bill of
Rights, when read as an integrated whole, extend implicitly to protect unenumerated
zones of privacy:  “[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.
Various guarantees create zones of privacy.” Id.  at 484 (citations omitted).  Despite
the Constitution’s lack of an overt guarantee of the right to privacy, Justice Douglas
relied on the implicit ideals encompassed by the penumbras of the First, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to conclude not only that a constitutionally protected
right to privacy exists, but that it is older than the Bill of Rights itself. Id.  at 486.
That notion is supported by the foundational documents.  The Declaration of Inde-
pendence, written eleven years prior to the Constitution, recognizes certain unalien-
able rights, including life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, not granted by
government , but by mankind’s Creator. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  When considered as one component of the basic right to liberty,
or the pursuit of happiness, a fundamental, preconstitutional right to privacy
emerges.  More recently, the Court has recognized that substantive due process ex-
tends beyond the right to privacy discussed in Griswold , protecting privacy in rela-
tion to personal autonomy:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing,
and education. . . .  These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.  At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own con-
cept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life.  Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of per-
sonhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (citations omitted).
43 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
44 Id.  at 8.
45 Id.
46 Id.  at 11-12.
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anti-miscegenation statutes were unconstitutional as a matter of
equal protection, the Court considered the substantive validity of
the law and the substantive quality of the right it burdened.47
Recognizing that “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recog-
nized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men,” the Court held that denying
this freedom on the basis of racial classifications is a deprivation
of liberty without due process of law.48  In so doing, the Court
considered the Constitution a source of individual rights, accessi-
ble on an individual basis by people who fall in love and wish to
get married.49  Concluding that the choice to marry is a funda-
mental right that includes the freedom to choose another inde-
pendent of skin color,50 the Court did not qualify the essential
nature of the right.  It did not condition recognition of the right
on an individual’s choosing only from a prefabricated pool of
partners acceptable in light of history and tradition51 or dictated
by contemporary perceptions and mores.52  Rather, the Court ex-
plicitly rejected such systems, rooted in little more than the




51 The specific Virginia statutes at issue in Loving  were adopted as part of the
Racial Integrity Act of 1924 and prohibited absolutely the marriage of a “white per-
son” to any other than another “white person”; required that marriage licenses be
withheld until state officials confirmed the accuracy of applicants’ assertions of race;
required that local and state registrars maintain certificates of “racial composition”;
and ensured that earlier prohibitions on interracial marriage were contemporane-
ously enforced. Id.  at 6.  While this particular statutory scheme was born in 1924,
the Court noted that “[p]enalties for miscegenation arose as an incident to slavery
and [had] been common in Virginia since the colonial period.” Id.  Furthermore,
the traditional notions of marriage holding sway at the time—at least in some cor-
ners—were expressed by the Virginia trial court in which the Lovings were initially
convicted:  “Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red,
and he placed them on separate continents.  And but for the interference with his
arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages.  The fact that he separated
the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.” Id.  at 3.
52 It is important to note that when the Court decided Loving , Virginia was one of
sixteen states that still prohibited interracial marriage. Id.  at 6.  Although fourteen
states had repealed similar prohibitions in the fifteen years prior to the Court’s deci-
sion, id.  at 6 n.5, nearly one-third of the states in the Union retained anti-miscegena-
tion statutes.  Furthermore, Virginia’s ban was reflective of the prevailing social
attitude and perception in the particular time and place in which it was challenged:
each of the sixteen states that retained interracial marriage bans in 1967 are south of
the Mason-Dixon line. See id.
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prejudice of a bygone era53 and defended on little ground other
than the comfort of the traditional status quo.54  Counter to long-
standing social practice and the codified law of sixteen states, the
Court recognized that the transcendent nature of the fundamen-
tal right is not diminished merely by its exercise in a new
context.55
A. The Right to Privacy in Private Matters:  Protecting the
Sanctity of Marriage
In light of Loving’s  fierce defense of the individual right to
marry, it should be remembered that marriage is mentioned no-
where in the Declaration of Independence, the United States
Constitution, or any of its twenty-seven amendments.56  How-
ever, it has long been recognized as a matter of constitutional
jurisprudence that substantive due process protects individual
rights relating to privacy, particularly those bearing on the inti-
mate choices relating to the family context.57  The Court first ex-
plicitly recognized a constitutionally protected right to privacy in
53 See, e.g., id.  at 11 (identifying no legitimate purpose for Virginia’s anti-miscege-
nation statutes beyond invidious racial discrimination).
54 In its brief to the Court, the State of Virginia argued first that the Fourteenth
Amendment—intended to effectuate the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1866—could not reach a state’s ban on interracial marriage because the Act was
meant to have “no application to marriage contracts or anti-miscegenation statutes.”
Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellee at 27, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (No. 395).  The State bolstered its appeal to history by pointing out that be-
cause its infringement on the right to marry had existed for over 200 years and
“stood compatably” [sic] with the Fourteenth Amendment since its adoption, the
statutes “infringe[d] no constitutional right.” Id.  at 52.
55 Simply put, the Court did not accept the postulate that the right to marry was
somehow stripped of its fundamental status merely because the identity of the indi-
viduals seeking to marry broke from the traditional status quo.  Similar logic obtains
elsewhere. See, e.g. , Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (“[H]istory and
tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive
due process inquiry.” (quoting County of Sacramenty v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857
(1998)(Kennedy, J., concurring))).
56 See generally  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(“The Constitution nowhere mentions a specific right of personal choice in matters
of marriage and family life . . . .”).
57 A line of cases dealing with a variety of contexts has protected individual au-
tonomy as a matter of substantive due process in personal decisions relating to mar-
riage (Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)); procreation (Skinner v. Oklahoma
ex rel . Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942)); contraception (Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972)); family relationships (Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944)); and child rearing and education (Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923)).
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Griswold v. Connecticut ,58 striking down a state law under which
a doctor and Planned Parenthood executive had been convicted
as accessories59 for providing contraceptive advice and devices to
married couples.60  Recognizing the implicit right to privacy un-
derlying the enumerated guarantees in the Bill of Rights61 as pro-
tecting the “sanctity of . . . home and the privacies of life,”62 the
Court was particularly concerned with the specter of state agents
busting into the privacy of the marital bedroom on suspicion that
anything other than the State’s vision of proper marital sex was
taking place.63  That the Constitution doesn’t explicitly grant a
right to privacy mattered little to the Court in recognizing a right
of privacy inherent in personhood and predating the Bill of
Rights.64  Such individual liberty is particularly precious in the
marital context, as Justice Douglas explained, because
“[m]arriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hope-
fully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.  It is
an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony
in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects.”65
Justice Douglas’ opinion in Griswold  highlights several consti-
tutionally significant components of marriage.  To begin, by
speaking to marriage’s role in furthering a way of life rather than
serving as a vehicle for politically fueled causes, it emphasizes the
deeply personal commitment made by each party to the mar-
riage.  Secondly, reference to the notion of bilateral loyalty calls
attention to the critical relational aspects being protected: the
58 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
59 The challenged statutes provided first for the fining and imprisonment of any-
one who used a “drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing
conception.” Id.  at 480.  The statute under which the appellants were convicted was
a general accessory statute allowing a person that assisted or counseled another to
commit an offense to be punished as the principal. Id.
60 Id.
61 See  discussion supra  note 42.
62 Griswold , 381 U.S. at 484.
63 Id.  at 485-86.  The Court asked rhetorically whether it would permit the State
to “search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives,” before concluding decisively that the idea is “repulsive to the no-
tions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.” Id .
64 Id.  at 486. See also discussion supra  note 42.
65 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.  Regardless of whether one agrees with Justice
Douglas’ conception of marriage, he knew of what he spoke, having been down that
road four times himself. See  Merle H. Weiner, “We Are Family”: Valuing Associa-
tionalism in Disputes Over Children’s Surnames , 75 N.C. L. REV. 1625, 1670 n.177
(1997) (noting that Justice William O. Douglas was married four times).
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companionship and devotion shared by two people within the
marital confines.  In this way, Griswold  unequivocally stands for
the proposition that marriage is constitutionally protected en-
tirely independent of its relationship to procreation and child
rearing.  The Connecticut statute prohibited the use of contra-
ceptives by married couples, a policy that clearly increased the
likelihood of procreation and the raising of children.  Yet when
faced with a policy intended to promote procreation, but that did
so to the derogation of marital intimacy,66 the Court found pre-
serving the sanctity of marriage67 to be a countervailing concern.
Preventing invasion of the physical privacy of the marital bed-
room was obviously central to the Griswold  Court’s reasoning.68
However, that narrow aspect of privacy was not the lone individ-
ual liberty implicated, and it was not the sole ground for the
Court’s decision.  Rather, in formulating its “penumbra” ap-
proach to recognizing a constitutionally protected right of pri-
vacy,69 the Court relied in part on the Self-Incrimination Clause
of the Fifth Amendment as creating a “zone of privacy which
government may not force [the citizen] to surrender to his detri-
ment.”70  The Court further described that right as protecting
against intrusion into the “privacies of life,” characterizing the
essence of the injury to the individual “not [as] the breaking of
his doors and the rummaging of his drawers” but as “the invasion
of his indefeasible right of personal security [and] personal
liberty.”71
The very language of Griswold  thus reveals that the Court was
not concerned merely with a right to privacy in the spatial con-
text,72 and did not intend to confine its application to behind
66 Griswold , 381 U.S. at 482 (characterizing the law as operating “directly on an
intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician’s role in one aspect of that
relation”). See also id.  at 486 (“Marriage is . . . intimate to the degree of being
sacred.”).
67 Id.  at 486 (describing the liberty at stake as the “notions of privacy surrounding
the marriage relationship”).
68 Id.
69 Id.  at 484.
70 Id.
71 Id.  n.* (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
72 Indeed, subsequent jurisprudence has not hemmed the notion of constitution-
ally protected privacy within spatial or physical borders.  Rather, the Court has rec-
ognized the right of privacy extends to internal  traits of personhood:  “If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual , married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters . . . fundamentally affecting a
person . . . .”  Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis added).
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closed doors and drawn curtains.  Rather, the specific constitu-
tional guarantees drawn on by the Griswold Court, divergent as
they may be, share common underpinnings protecting an individ-
ual right to internal, personal privacy.  For example, the nature of
the privacy interest created by the Fifth Amendment73 is internal
to the individual, a right to privacy in  choosing whether to speak
on one’s behalf.74  Similarly, the Court recognized the internally
held and internally exercised nature of certain liberties protected
by the right to privacy emanating from the First Amendment’s
penumbra.75  By relying on these aspects of constitutionally pro-
tected privacy, it follows that the Court was not concerned solely
with protecting the sanctity of the marital bedroom enveloped
within the marital home.76  Instead, the Court simultaneously
recognized an individual, indefeasible right of personal liberty,
extending to the intimate decisions made within the confines of
the “privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”77
B. Fundamental Even for Non-Fundamentalists:  The Right to
Marry in Nontraditional Contexts
Two years after Griswold demarcated a right to privacy of
thought, choice, and action inhering in an established marital re-
lationship, Loving  recognized the fundamental right to choose
not only whether to establish such a relationship, but with
whom.78  Two principal decisions subsequently added texture to
the bare form of this fundamental right.
First, in Zablocki v. Redhail ,79 the Court struck down a statu-
tory scheme that conditioned the right to marry upon proof of
compliance with preexisting child support obligations.80  Casting
73 See Griswold , 381 U.S. at 484.
74 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself . . . .”).
75 See Griswold , 381 U.S. at 482-83 (noting that the First Amendment protects not
only the right to speak or publish in public, but also envelops privacies internally
held by the individual such as “the right to read,” the “freedom of inquiry,” the
“freedom of thought,” and “the right of belief”).
76 Rather, the interest infringed by the Connecticut statute “involved . . . a partic-
ularly important and sensitive area of privacy–that of the marital relation  and the
marital home.” Id.  at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
77 Id.  at 486 (majority opinion).
78 See supra  notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
79 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
80 Id . at 375, 377.  The statute applied to any “Wisconsin resident having minor
issue not in his custody and which he is under obligation to support by any court
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the statutory scheme under an equal protection lens,81 the Court
relied heavily on the components of substantive due process82 to
conclude that it must be stricken for “interfer[ing] with the exer-
cise of a fundamental right”83 absent a sufficient state interest.84
Two facets of Zablocki  must be emphasized.  To begin, it further
supports the proposition that the Court has never treated the
fundamental right to marry as coextensive with either the right of
procreation or the multi-faceted state interest in protecting the
best interests of children.  The stricken law prohibited anyone
who could not prove compliance with existing child support obli-
gations from marrying.85  Presumably, the law would protect the
interests of specifically at-risk children by ensuring that a noncus-
todial parent fulfilled his or her financial obligations to the child
before entering marriage—the only relationship in which the
State lawfully allowed sexual relations and the concomitant pos-
sibility of further procreation.86  However, despite the genuine
validity of the State’s proffered interest,87 the statute’s uneven
sweep88 in relation to its stated purpose constituted an unconsti-
tutionally broad infringement of the right to marry.89  In addition
to the implicit partitioning of the right to marry and the parental
responsibility to protect children—which was necessary to its
holding—the Court affirmatively recognized that marriage on
the one hand, and procreation and child rearing on the other, are
not coextensive:
It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed
order or judgment,” and further required a demonstration that any child covered by
a support order was not then, and was unlikely to become, a public charge. Id.
81 See id.  at 382.
82 See, e.g. , id.  at 383-85 (collecting substantive due process cases concerning “the
right of personal privacy” and its protection of the fundamental decision to marry);
see also id.  at 395 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing the equal
protection doctrine as applied as “no more than substantive due process by another
name”).
83 Id.  at 388 (majority opinion).
84 Id.  at 390-91.
85 Id.  at 375.
86 See id.  at 386 & n.11 (citing WIS. STAT. § 944.15 (1973), which at the time levied
criminal penalties for fornication, defined as sexual intercourse with a person other
than a spouse).  The current version of the statute punishes only public fornication.
See WIS. STAT. § 944.15 (2005).
87 See Zablocki , 434 U.S.  at 388 (accepting “for present purposes” that protecting
the welfare of out-of-custody children is a legitimate and substantial interest).
88 See id.  at 390 (describing the statute as both “grossly underinclusive” and “sub-
stantially overinclusive”).
89 Id.  at 389.
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on the same level of importance as decisions relating to pro-
creation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships.  . . .
[I]t would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with
respect to other matters  of family life and not with respect to
the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of
the family in our society.90
Zablocki  is instructive on another point.  That is, despite the
substantial nature of a State’s interest in providing for the well-
being of its children,91 any restriction that significantly interferes
with the right to marry is subject to the traditional strict scrutiny
applied to laws that burden fundamental rights.92  In short, a
State’s legitimate concern about the welfare of children and
adoption of a law aimed at protecting that welfare does not
lessen the State’s burden of proving the tight means-ends fit re-
quired by strict scrutiny when a fundamental right is implicated.93
Just as the Griswold  Court chose to preserve the sanctity of an
established marriage when faced with a burdensome state policy
geared to encourage procreation, the Zablocki  Court soundly re-
affirmed the right to choose marriage in the face of burdensome
state regulations aimed at protecting the welfare of children.
The second principal right-to-marry case defining the contours
of the fundamental right announced in Loving  is Turner v.
Safley ,94 which struck down a state prison policy that severely
restricted the right of inmates to marry.95  In so doing, the Court
90 Id.  at 386 (emphasis added).
91 See supra note 87.
92 See, e.g., Zablocki , 434 U.S. at 383 (“Since our past decisions make clear that
the right to marry is of fundamental importance, and since the classification at issue
here significantly interferes with the exercise of that right, we believe that ‘critical
examination’ of the state interests advanced in support of the classification is re-
quired.”); see also id.  at 388 (“When a statutory classification significantly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported
by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only
those interests.”); id.  at 387 (characterizing the statutes at issue as effecting a “seri-
ous intrusion into [the] freedom of choice in an area in which we have held such
freedom to be fundamental”).
93 See id.  at 389 (declaring that the statutory purpose of creating incentive for
noncustodial parents to make support payments “cannot justify the statute’s broad
infringement on the right to marry”).
94 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
95 The marriage regulation at issue made inmates’ right to marry contingent on
being granted permission by the prison superintendent, and provided that marriages
should be permitted only when compelling reasons to do so presented themselves.
Id.  at 82.  The regulation did not define “compelling,” but trial testimony indicated
that as a general matter only pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate child were
considered compelling reasons. Id.
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carved an exception to the strict scrutiny standard applied in
Zablocki .  Recognizing the need to defer to the on-the-ground
wisdom and expertise of prison administrators concerning insti-
tutional operations, the Court adopted a “reasonable relation-
ship” standard under which to examine prison regulations
burdening inmates’ constitutional rights.96  However, even under
that relaxed standard, placing an inmate’s right to choose mar-
riage at the sole discretion and mercy of a state official went too
far97 in stripping the individual of constitutional protections that
are not suspended at the intake counter of a state penitentiary.98
En route to that conclusion, the Court highlighted two principles
bearing on the constitutionality of Measure 36’s prohibition of
same-sex marriage.
First, the Court noted that an inmate “‘retains those [constitu-
tional] rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a pris-
oner.’”99  Second, the Court offered an expansive list of the
constitutionally significant qualities inhering in marriage and
warranting rigorous protection—even in the nontraditional con-
text of inmate marriage.  The Court noted, for instance, that “in-
mate marriages, like others, are expressions of emotional support
and public commitment.”100  Those elements, in turn, form “an
important and significant aspect of the marital relationship.”101
The Court also emphasized the spiritual aspect of marriage, not-
ing that for at least some couples “the commitment of marriage
may be an exercise of religious faith as well as an expression of
personal dedication.”102  Additionally, the Court recognized the
tangible government benefits103 and “other, less tangible bene-
fits”104 that attach as common incidents of marriage.
96 Id.  at 89-91.  The Court laid out the appropriate standard thusly:  “[W]hen a
prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if
it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id . at 89.
97 See id.  at 91 (stating that the marriage restriction failed the reasonable relation-
ship standard as an “exaggerated response” to the state’s rehabilitation and security
concerns); id.  at 97 (“[E]ven under the reasonable relationship test, the marriage
regulation does not withstand scrutiny.”).
98 See id . at 84 (stating that “[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison
inmates from the protections of the Constitution”).
99 Id.  at 95 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
100 Id.
101 Id.  at 96.
102 Id.
103 Id.  (pointing to Social Security benefits and property rights, such as inheri-
tance rights, as examples).
104 Id.  Here, the Court offered the single example of legitimizing children born
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Those are traits the Court itself identified as constitutionally
significant accoutrements of marriage.  And there can be little
dispute they are just as relevant, sacred, and important to indi-
viduals in same-sex relationships as to those involved in differ-
ent-sex relationships.  More specifically, sexual orientation
diminishes neither one’s ability nor desire to partake of these and
other incidents of marriage, up to and including the religious as-
pect.105  Simply put, “being gay” has no bearing on one’s fitness
or capacity to reap the goodness of marriage described in Turner .
Yet Measure 36 makes it the absolute and irremediable litmus
test for access to the relationship imbued with—and constitution-
ally defined by—those qualities.  Such an explicit disability, ex-
acted so definitively and erected on such flimsy grounds, seems
patently incompatible with the principles underlying Turner
alone, independent of any consideration of other constitutional
jurisprudence.
It is worth noting that the Turner  Court characterized an in-
mate’s right to marry as a constitutionally protected liberty that
is “not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner.”106  While cir-
cumstances may vary by degree, a safe generalization is that a
prisoner’s “status” exemplifies the most extreme degradation of
individual liberty and theft of personal identity sanctioned by
contemporary American law.  It is a status of subjugation.  It is a
status defined by institutional mandates establishing when one
gets up, when one may bathe, when and what one may eat, when
one may exercise, what one may wear, and when one must go to
bed.  Yet, bereft of choice concerning all but the most rudimen-
tary aspects of existence, an inmate still retains a constitutionally
out of wedlock. Id.  However, just as relevant and just as seamlessly added to the
list of intangible benefits are other unquantifiable incidents of marriage such as legi-
timization of the couple and social recognition of the commitment made to the rela-
tionship by each individual involved.
105 See  Michael J. Kanotz, For Better or for Worse: A Critical Analysis of Florida’s
Defense of Marriage Act , 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 439, 439 (1998) (“Several major
religions in the United States recognize same-sex marriages, including the Reformed
Jewish, Unitarian Universalist, Episcopalian, Lutheran, Presbyterian and Methodist
churches, among others.”); see also Complaint, supra  note 17, at 5-6 (describing
plaintiff Glenna Shepherd as the senior pastor of the Metropolitan Community
Church of Portland, “a progressive, inclusive worldwide movement of more than 300
churches in twenty countries around the world.  It is a Christ-centered community of
faith that welcomes all people and has a primary outreach to gay, lesbian, bisexual
and transgendered communities”).  The complaint further states that Shepherd has
performed hundreds of marriages for same-sex couples. Id.  at 6.
106 482 U.S. at 95.
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protected right to choose marriage.107
That central holding of Turner  illuminates the focal nature of
the right to marry among the various personal liberties protected
by substantive due process.108  For even when the most basic day-
to-day decisions of personhood are stripped away, the fundamen-
tal and fundamentally protected choice of whether to marry an-
other is preserved at the individual level, free from state
compulsion and immune from unreasonable state interference.109
In the light shed by Turner , then, the question arises:  If an in-
mate’s status of state-defined deprivation of choice is “not incon-
sistent” with the choice to marry, what peculiar status do
homosexual individuals occupy such that the right to marry may
constitutionally be withheld?
The obvious rejoinder from same-sex marriage opponents is
that Measure 36 deprives no one absolutely of the right to marry
but merely defines the field of legally cognizable partners.  Simi-
lar logic has been tried and found wanting elsewhere.  The Lov-
ing Court, for example, made clear that a State could not justify
depriving interracial couples of the right to marry on the grounds
that such individuals retained the right to marry, just not some-
one of another race.110  The argument is similarly unpersuasive
here.  What purpose is served by protecting the right to marry as
a fundamental individual liberty and simultaneously refusing to
protect the right to choose whom  to marry?111
Additionally, both Zablocki  and Turner  counsel against such
an analysis. Zablocki  essentially stands for the interrelated pro-
positions that the family is entitled to substantial constitutional
protection,112 that marriage can be a central part of family,113 and
that the choice to marry should thus be similarly protected.114
However, arguing that each member of a homosexual couple
107 Id.  at 99-100.
108 See supra  note 57 and accompanying text.
109 See Turner,  482 U.S. at 89.
110 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
111 This point seems so elementary as to need little further discussion.  However,
as an analogy, what good would the Free Exercise Clause serve if such free exercise
was extended only to those who chose Catholicism? See U.S. CONST. amend. I
(“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
112 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 385 (1978) (noting the constitutionally
protected nature of individual decisions relating to procreation, contraception, fam-
ily relationships, child rearing, and education) (internal citations omitted).
113 See id.  at 386.
114 Id.  (“[I]t would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to
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raising a child together has the right to marry someone of the
opposite sex is at least incompatible with, and perhaps antitheti-
cal to, promoting the family interest emphasized in Zablocki .115
Turner  exposes a different set of foibles in the argument that
Measure 36 does no more than restrict the choice of whom to
marry.  It should be noted that the regulation at issue in Turner
did not conclusively absolve inmates’ choice to marry, but rather
conditioned that right on receiving permission from the prison
superintendent for “compelling reasons.”116  For all practical pur-
poses, however, inmates were forbidden to marry except in cases
of pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate child.117  Such a broad
prohibition, requiring either a pregnancy extant at the time of
incarceration or conception during incarceration, effectively fore-
closed the option of marriage for most inmates.  Analogously,
Measure 36 effectively shuts the door to marriage to homosexual
individuals.  Presuming both that most people choose a marital
partner according to their own sexual orientation, and that most
people would not consider marriage counter to that orientation a
legitimate option, Measure 36 operates practically to deprive ho-
mosexual individuals of the choice to marry.  Just as in Turner ,
such a broad infringement of a fundamental right need not reach
the heights of an absolute prohibition on marriage before it can
no longer withstand constitutional inquiry.
One final point about Turner  warrants examination.  While
discussing the critical attributes of marriage, Justice O’Connor
noted that because most inmates are eventually released, most
inmate marriages are entered into under the expectation that the
marriage eventually will be fully consummated.118  Although the
point made emphasizes a single aspect of the personal right to
choose marriage, it also reveals another facet of the Court’s con-
ception of that right.  While Griswold and Zablocki  firmly hold
that procreation is neither a condition precedent nor a required
other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the relation-
ship that is the foundation of the family in our society.”).
115 In such a scenario, the child of the homosexual couple would be no more so-
cially legitimized by having two homosexual parents, each of whom happened to be
married to an opposite-sex partner while maintaining their relationship, than by hav-
ing two unmarried homosexual parents.  Similarly, by prohibiting the appellee from
marrying the mother of his second child, the net result of the statute at issue in
Zablocki  was “simply more illegitimate children.” Id.  at 390.
116 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 82 (1987).
117 Id.
118 Id.  at 96.
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outcome of marriage, Turner  goes even further.  For at least
some inmates have no chance of ever being released.  Others
may not outlive their sentences.  Yet even those inmates may not
be prohibited from entering into marriage relationships that in
some instances would be formed with no expectation of ultimate
consummation.  By recognizing that the marital interest in sexual
relations is an expected component of most, rather than all, in-
mate marriages, Justice O’Connor made two points abundantly
clear.  First, the physical act of sexual intercourse, like procrea-
tion and child rearing, is entirely distinct from the fundamental
right to choose marriage.  Second, while it is a constitutionally
significant incident of marriage, the expectation of sexual inter-
course is not a condition precedent to constitutional protection
of marriage.  Thus, after Turner , marriage not only concerns a
fundamental interest regardless of the actual or potential exis-
tence of children, it also concerns a fundamental interest regard-
less of the actual or potential incidence of sexual intercourse.119
The Loving  line of cases thus establishes two elemental princi-
ples beyond question.  Discussion of the first principle comprises
the balance of this Part, while Part III undertakes consideration
of the second.
To begin, the line of cases beginning with Loving establishes
that the right to marry is fundamentally important to all individu-
als120 for a variety of closely related yet discrete reasons.121
However, existence does not necessarily equate with recognition,
and terming a given liberty interest a fundamental right in one
context does not necessarily mean it will be treated as a funda-
mental right in the next.  Thus, when faced with the expression of
a fundamental right in a new context, such as the right to marry
with regard to same-sex couples, the Court considers whether the
implicated interest is so deeply rooted in the nation’s history and
traditions as to be implicit in the Anglo-American concept of or-
dered liberty.122  It may well be argued that the right to marry a
119 That this conclusion is the constitutional state of play is not surprising.  Impo-
tent men and paralysis victims are two examples of individuals who cannot have
sexual relations because of sheer physical incapacity.  However, such conditions are
not fraught with an attendant loss of the fundamental right to marry.  This funda-
mental reality was explicitly recognized by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts when striking down that state’s statutory bar to same-sex marriages in a
landmark 2003 decision. See infra  notes 200-215 and accompanying text.
120 Zablocki , 434 U.S. at 384.
121 See, e.g. , Turner , 482 U.S. at 95-96.
122 See  Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 & nn. 10, 12 (1977).
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same-sex partner is not so deeply rooted, and thus laws such as
Measure 36 are properly analyzed under rational basis review.
This argument is flawed in at least two ways.
First, there is reasonable cause to doubt that the “deeply
rooted” test remains the sole tool available to identify fundamen-
tal rights.  The Court has at least suggested an evolving standard
to identify and classify claimed rights, based upon the drafters’
purpose that the Constitution remain agile enough to respond to
unforeseen questions, so that “persons in every generation can
invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.”123
While not all rights are fundamental, determining which are can-
not simply be a matter of determining whether the implicated
interest as specifically expressed is deeply rooted in this nation’s
history and traditions.124
Second, even with application of the deeply rooted test, it does
not necessarily follow that same-sex marriage does not implicate
a fundamental right.  Initially, it must be acknowledged that the
narrow instance of men marrying men and women marrying wo-
123 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  In this connection, the Court stated:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of lib-
erty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific.  They
did not presume to have this insight.  They knew times can blind us to cer-
tain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary
and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, per-
sons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for
greater freedom.
Id.  at 578-79.
124 If appealing to history were the lone consideration, one would expect numer-
ous cases to come out differently because the specific act at issue had little basis as a
deeply rooted part of our tradition or history.  For example, Griswold  protected a
married couple’s right to use contraceptives as part of the broader right to privacy,
despite long-standing state prohibitions on such use. See  Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 505-06 (1965) (White, J., concurring) (noting that the State disap-
proved of contraceptive use as a means of facilitating illicit sexual relationships and
had prohibited such use for more than eighty years).  Similarly, the Loving  Court
recognized the fundamental right to marry a person of another race, despite wide-
spread historical and contemporary opposition. See  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
6, 12 (1967) (noting that anti-miscegenation statutes had been common since the
colonial period, and that at the time of the decision sixteen states still prohibited
interracial marriage).  Finally, in Roe v. Wade  the Court held that the constitution-
ally guaranteed right to privacy includes a woman’s fundamental right to choose an
abortion, despite historical evidence that casts doubt on the notion that the right to
an abortion is intimately bound up with our history or tradition. See  Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that because a majority
of states at the time had restricted abortion for at least a century, it is not so deeply
rooted as to be considered a fundamental right).
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men is not a deeply rooted part of this nation’s history and tradi-
tion.  That precise argument, however, applies just as forcefully
to interracial marriage between black and white individuals.  The
same could likely be said of inmates’ choice to marry and of mar-
riages involving indigent people who cannot afford their child
support payments.  However, despite circumstantial variances,
each of these situations shares a common element:  Implication
of the constitutionally protected fundamental right to choose
marriage.  And, in each case, the Court rejected the opportunity
to define the implicated interest narrowly in favor of broadly
construing and protecting the fundamental right to marry, de-
spite the nontraditional context in which it was asserted.125
So it is that the precise liberty repeatedly protected against
state-contrived infringement is severely burdened by Measure 36.
Just as in Loving , a recognized and constitutionally protected as-
pect of personal liberty is being withheld on the sole ground of a
partner’s genetically-determined makeup.126  Just as in Zablocki ,
a variety of justifications purporting to protect the family unit
have been offered to justify the deprivation.127  And, just as in
Turner , members of a traditionally marginalized minority group
125 See Turner , 482 U.S. at 78 (inmate marriages); Zablocki , 434 U.S. at 374 (mar-
riages involving indigent individuals); Loving , 388 U.S. 1 (interracial marriages).
126 Though perhaps more germane to an equal protection challenge to Measure
36, it is worth noting this similarity:  The Virginia statute in Loving  prohibited a
white person from marrying anyone besides another white person—a genetically
determined characteristic.  Similarly, Measure 36 prohibits individuals from mar-
rying a partner of the same sex—also a genetically determined characteristic.
127 Because Measure 36 was a ballot measure to amend the Oregon Constitution,
and because of the posture of the current litigation, the State has never had occasion
to argue the merits of Measure 36 in relation to the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  However, the Defense of Marriage Coalition (DOMC), an
intervenor-defendant in the Li  litigation, see supra  notes 6-17 and accompanying
text, has presented arguments in favor of Oregon’s statutory prohibition of same-sex
marriage that DOMC may well reprise in favor of the constitutional prohibition of
same-sex marriage embodied in Measure 36.  In its brief to the Oregon Supreme
Court in the Li  case, DOMC argued that banning same-sex marriage is justified
because of biological differences relating to procreation (“[I]f a partner in a same
sex relationship produces a child, it is not genetic procreation by the two partners .
Natural procreation is always the result of sexual intercourse between a physically
healthy man and a woman.”); child rearing (“same sex couples and married parents
are not similarly situated regarding child rearing because a same sex couple can
never provide a child with the advantages of being raised by both biological par-
ents”); and historical status (“The only historical cultures that supposedly accepted
same sex relationships were those without momentum.”). See  Intervenor-Defend-
ants-Appellants, Cross-Respondents Defense of Marriage Coalition Opening Brief
at 29-36, Li v. Oregon, Civil No. S51612 (S. Ct. Or., filed Sept. 20, 2004).
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are being denied a fundamental right that is not inconsistent with
their present status.  The deprivation, however, is starkly incon-
sistent with the Court’s proclamation that “the right to marry is
of fundamental importance for all individuals.”128  If that indeed
is the case, it is hard to see how the fundamental right to marry
can be construed to exclude the right to choose a partner of the
same sex.  The fundamental interest in personal liberty and au-
tonomy enveloping the choice to marry could not be shackled by
prohibitions on interracial marriage, inmate marriage, or the
marriage of an indigent with child support obligations.  Similarly,
under this body of well-settled law, that individually held interest
should not be irrevocably held captive on the basis of one’s
choosing a same-sex partner.
III
AWAY FROM AN UNCERTAIN COMPASS:  TAKING
MORAL DISAPPROVAL OFF THE TABLE AS
A LEGITIMATE STATE INTEREST
The second core principle emerging from the Loving  line of
cases is that while the State may legitimately impose reasonable
restrictions that do not significantly interfere with the decision to
marry,129 there exists a “limit beyond which a State may not con-
stitutionally go.”130  As a corollary to that principle, the Court’s
holding in Lawrence v . Texas131 unmistakably delineates inter-
ests upon which a State may not constitutionally rely to justify
prohibitions on same-sex marriage.
Faced with a state law prohibiting oral and anal sex between
same-sex individuals,132 under which two consenting adults were
convicted for conduct undertaken within the privacy of the
home,133 the Court in Lawrence once again refused to confine
the liberty recognized in Griswold  within a narrow majoritarian
128 Zablocki , 434 U.S. at 384.
129 See id.  at 386.
130 Id.  at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring).
131 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
132 The statute at issue punished “deviate sexual intercourse” only with a same-
sex partner, defining “deviate sexual intercourse” as any contact between one’s geni-
tals and another’s mouth or anus; or the penetration of the genitals or anus of an-
other with an object. Id.  at 563.
133 Id.  at 578 (noting that the case did not involve minors, individuals incapable of
consenting, public conduct, or prostitution, but rather “two adults who, with full and
mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosex-
ual lifestyle”).
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view of history or tradition.134  Moreover, by invalidating the law
as a matter of substantive due process,135 the Court conclusively
established that the liberty of the individual cannot be forsaken
merely in the name of adhering to the Court’s own precedents.136
But in overruling its earlier decision in Bowers v. Hardwick ,137
the Court did more than cast aside a decision whose underpin-
nings had “sustained serious erosion.”138  Rather, it took general
moral disapproval off the table as a legitimate state interest able
to justify prohibiting traditionally disfavored conduct.139
In Bowers , the Court split 5-4 in upholding a state law prohib-
iting all individuals, regardless of sex or sexual orientation, from
engaging in anal or oral sex.140  However, the law was challenged
by a homosexual man,141 and the Court’s disposition of the case
hinged on the conclusion that engaging in homosexual sodomy is
not a constitutionally protected right.142  Framing the issue as
“whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates
the laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal
and have done so for a very long time,”143 the majority empha-
sized a State’s prerogative to flatly prohibit sexual activity it con-
sidered “immoral and unacceptable.”144  Such authority existed,
134 See id.  at 566-72 (discussing the historical development of laws prohibiting ho-
mosexual sexual acts before concluding that the laws and traditions of the past half
century “are of most relevance” and reflect “an emerging awareness that liberty
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private
lives in matters pertaining to sex”); see also id.  at 572 (“[H]istory and tradition are
the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process
inquiry.”) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring)).
135 Id.  at 578 (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”).
136 See id.  at 577 (describing the doctrine of stare decisis  as a prudential considera-
tion rather than “an inexorable command”); see also id.  at 579 (“[T]imes can blind
us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary
and proper in fact serve only to oppress.  As the Constitution endures, persons in
every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.”).
137 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
138 See Lawrence , 539 U.S. at 576.
139 See id.  at 577-78 (recognizing Justice Stevens’ dissent in Bowers , which argued
that traditional perceptions of a practice as immoral are not enough to uphold a law
prohibiting the practice, as controlling the issue before the Court).
140 See  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.1 (1986).
141 See id.  at 188.
142 See id.  at 190.
143 Id.
144 Id.  at 196.
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partially, because in the Court’s view prohibitions on homosex-
ual sodomy had “ancient roots.”145  Chief Justice Burger ampli-
fied the appeal to history and majoritarian morality in his
concurrence, arguing that the regulation of homosexual conduct
has been a common government function “throughout the his-
tory of Western civilization.”146  Chief Justice Burger further ar-
gued that “[c]ondemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in
Judeao-Christian moral and ethical” tradition and that protecting
homosexual sodomy as a fundamental right would “cast aside
millennia of moral teaching.”147  Since no such right existed, ra-
tional basis review attached and the state’s interest in imposing
its version of morality justified the prohibition of intimate sexual
relations between homosexual individuals.148
That view of the legitimacy of a state’s interest in enforcing
moral standards prevailed with five Justices when Bowers  was
decided.149  Seventeen years later, Lawrence  changed that.
145 Id.  at 192.
146 Id.  at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
147 Id.  at 196-97.
148 Id.  at 197.
149 Justice Blackmun attacked the majority’s reliance on morals-based value judg-
ments:  “[T]he fact that the moral judgments expressed by [statutes such as the one
at issue] may be ‘natural and familiar . . . ought not to conclude our judgment upon
the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the
United States.’” Id.  at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).  Taking
more explicit issue with the majority’s reasoning, Justice Blackmun argued that if the
constitutional right to privacy means anything, it means that before a State may
“prosecute its citizens for making choices about the most intimate aspects of their
lives, it must do more than assert that the choice they have made is an ‘abominable
crime not fit to be named among Christians.’” Id.  at 199-200 (citation omitted).
Justice Blackmun also criticized the Court for ignoring the basic reasons why certain
individual rights associated with the family are protected by the Due Process Clause:
“We protect those rights not because they contribute, in some direct and material
way, to the general public welfare, but because they form so central a part of an
individual’s life.” Id.  at 204.  Justice Stevens also dissented, arguing in part that the
Court’s prior cases made “abundantly clear” that “the fact that the governing major-
ity in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a suffi-
cient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor
tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.” Id.
at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  And, even before Bowers was overruled by Law-
rence , conviction in its holding and rationale began to wane among some who joined
the majority position.  Justice Powell is widely considered to have come to regret
joining the majority in Bowers . See, e.g. , PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CON-
STITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING:  CASES AND MATERIALS 1258 (4th ed. 2000) (noting
Justice Powell’s regret concerning his position in Bowers  and his explanation that he
had never met a homosexual); Ruth Marcus, Powell Regrets Backing Sodomy Law ,
WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1990, at A3 (quoting Justice Powell as saying, in a speech to
law students, “I think I probably made a mistake in that one.”).
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A. Morality No Longer Enough—Where’s the Harm?
Overruling Bowers in no uncertain terms,150 the Lawrence
Court determined the issue it faced was squarely controlled by
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Bowers .151  There, Justice Stevens em-
phasized that the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence
made “abundantly clear” that “the fact that the governing major-
ity in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as im-
moral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting
the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law
prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.”152
After Lawrence , neither may those interests alone justify Mea-
sure 36’s prohibition of same-sex marriage.  By endorsing Justice
Stevens’ dissent in Bowers , the Lawrence  Court definitively took
mere moral disapproval, as well as historically prevailing mores,
out of the mix of interests the State may legitimately offer to
justify infringement upon individually held liberty interests.153
That is to say, the State may not constitutionally prohibit sexual
activity between same-sex individuals on the basis of “promoting
morality” without showing some further harm prevented, or
some further interest served.  Nor can such laws be saved be-
cause the prohibited activity has historically been considered im-
moral.  As discussed below, there is no principled reason why
this logic should not extend to prohibitions on same-sex mar-
riage.  Simply put, under Lawrence , Measure 36 must be justified
on some grounds apart from a bare desire to promote moral-
ity,154 and independent of the argument that same-sex marriage
150 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Bowers  was not correct when it
was decided, and it is not correct today.  It ought not to remain binding precedent.
Bowers v. Hardwick  should be and now is overruled.”).
151 Id.  (“Justice Stevens’ analysis, in our view, should have been controlling in
Bowers  and should control here.”).
152 Bowers , 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. id.  at 210 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (“I cannot agree that either the length of time a majority has held its
convictions or the passions with which it defends them can withdraw legislation from
this Court’s scrutiny.”).
153 Lawrence , 539 U.S. at 578 (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state in-
terest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual.”).
154 Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion states as much.  Justice O’Connor de-
parted from the majority and argued that the Texas prohibition on same-sex oral and
anal sex was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id.  at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Yet she too recognized that
plain moral disapproval would not suffice to justify a prohibition on same-sex mar-
riage. Id.  at 585 (noting that the State could not assert any legitimate interest, but
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is not a historically recognized institution.155  While noting the
infirmities of Bowers’  depiction of the historical condemnation of
homosexual conduct,156 Lawrence  did not sidestep the historical
issue but rather addressed it head-on.  The Court acknowledged
Bowers ’ broader point that powerful voices, influenced by relig-
ious beliefs, notions of acceptable behavior, and respect for the
traditional family unit, had condemned homosexual conduct as
immoral for hundreds of years.157  Even so, the Court concluded
that:
These considerations do not answer the question before us. . . .
The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the
State to enforce these views on the whole society through op-
eration of the criminal law.  “Our obligation is to define the
liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”158
B. Does One Plus One Equal Two for Same-Sex Partners?
Exercise of that obligation not only required rejection of Bow-
ers , it also signaled a constitutional legitimization of same-sex re-
lationships based upon “an emerging awareness that liberty gives
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to con-
stating that, unlike moral disapproval of homosexual relationships—the interest as-
serted by the State in Lawrence—there are “other reasons . . . to promote the insti-
tution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group”).
155 The Court’s opinion in Loving v. Virginia , 388 U.S. 1 (1967), declaring anti-
miscegenation statutes violative of due process despite the historical prevalence of
such statutes, indicates the Court has long viewed simple appeals to history as insuf-
ficient to support prohibitions on marriage. See supra  notes 43-55 and accompany-
ing text.  Furthermore, the proposition that same-sex marriage may not be
prohibited merely because it falls outside of the “traditional” definition of marriage
seems to flow lockstep from the majority’s adoption of Justice Stevens’ dissent in
Bowers , which stated that “the fact that the governing majority in a State has tradi-
tionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for uphold-
ing a law prohibiting the practice.” Lawrence , 539 U.S. at 577 (citing Bowers , 478
U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  However, this is another point on which Justice
O’Connor appears to depart from the majority. See id.  at 585 (O’Connor, J., con-
curring) (stating that the prohibition of same-sex sexual activity was supported by no
legitimate interest, “such as national security or preserving the traditional institution
of marriage”).
156 Id.  at 571 (majority opinion) (characterizing the historical grounds Bowers  re-
lied upon as more complex than indicated by either the majority or Chief Justice
Burger and stating that “[t]heir historical premises are not without doubt, and at the
very least, are overstated”).
157 Id.
158 Id.  (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
850 (1992)).  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence  traces Justice Black-
mun’s Bowers  dissent closely on this point. See infra  notes 222-223 and accompany-
ing text.
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duct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”159  That
emerging awareness exposed both Bowers’  misapprehension of
the liberty implicated, and its crude methodology for disposing of
it:  “To say that the issue in Bowers  was simply the right to en-
gage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual
put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to
be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual inter-
course.”160  Aside from the point that this line of argument is
foreclosed by Turner ,161 this statement seemingly indicates the
Court’s recognition that homosexual couples are as fit as hetero-
sexual married  couples to reap the nonsexual benefits of commit-
ted relationships.162  The central holding of Lawrence , in turn,
extends constitutional protection to the private and consensual
sexual activity of two adults regardless of each individual’s sex or
orientation.163  Thus, sexual intimacy, the constitutionally pro-
tected physical component of marriage,164 is a right available on
equal ground to homosexual individuals.  And as Lawrence ex-
plains, casting an intimate relationship as implicating nothing
more than that right demeans homosexual individuals precisely
as it demeans the individuals who compose a married couple.165
These distinct considerations combine to form a single proposi-
tion emerging from Lawrence .  Simply put, homosexual individu-
als both have a constitutional right to engage in the
constitutionally protected physical aspect of marriage, and are
constitutionally capable of enjoying the constitutionally pro-
159 Lawrence , 539 U.S. at 559.
160 Id.  at 567.
161 See supra  note 119 and accompanying text.
162 See Lawrence , 539 U.S. at 567 (“When sexuality finds overt expression in inti-
mate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal
bond that is more enduring.  The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homo-
sexual persons the right to make this choice.”); cf . Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96
(1987) (discussing various beneficial incidents such as emotional support, public
commitment, and spiritual significance as components of marriage constitutionally
distinct from marital sexual intercourse).
163 See Lawrence , 539 U.S. at 578 (“The State cannot demean [petitioners’] exis-
tence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.  Their
right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in
their conduct without intervention of the government.”); see also id.  (“The Texas
statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual.”).
164 See Turner , 482 U.S. at 78; Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
165 See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“[T]he marital couple is
not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.”).
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tected emotional aspects of marriage.166  Homosexual individuals
thus have a constitutional right to enjoy the component parts of
marriage.  Yet Measure 36 forbids them access to the integrated
institution.  As discussed below, there is no rational reason why
this equation of one plus one should not equal two for same-sex
partners.
While legitimizing homosexual individuals’ ability  to experi-
ence the psychological and emotional benefits of marriage, Law-
rence  definitively recognizes their constitutional prerogative  to
do so as part of the personal autonomy protected by substantive
due process.  “[O]ur laws and tradition,” the Court said, “afford
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rear-
ing, and education.”167  Furthermore, that protection is not
contingent upon satisfying some traditional “moral” standard.
Rather, “[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek auton-
omy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.”168  Yet
with its absolute prohibition of same-sex marriage, Measure 36
stamps out the right of individuals in homosexual relationships to
seek autonomy through the most basic, personal, and intimate
means of all:  The choice to marry the person they love.
A similarly bruising deprivation of individual liberty, “state-
sponsored condemnation”169 of private sexual practices, could
not stand in Lawrence .  The challenged statute not only failed to
advance any legitimate state interest,170 it actively authorized the
denigration of homosexuals.171  Although the statute exacted a
relatively minor criminal penalty,172 the social subjugation im-
plicit in its justification and attendant in its operation bore much
heavier weight.  Extending its inquiry beyond the statute’s legal
166 If this were not the case, it would make little sense to argue that casting homo-
sexual relationships as involving merely the right to have sex demeans the individual
claim to liberty in the same way it would demean a married couple to define that
relationship as implicating only the right to have sex. See Lawrence , 539 U.S. at 567.
167 Id.  at 574 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992)).
168 Id.
169 Id. at 576.
170 Id.  at 578.
171 See id.  at 574-75 (describing the statute as imposing a stigma upon the lives of
homosexual individuals).
172 See id. at 575 (noting that violating the statute amounted to a class C misde-
meanor, “a minor offense” under Texas law).
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formalities, the Court recognized the debilitating normative ef-
fect of the stricken law:
When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the
State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject
homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and
in the private spheres.  The central holding of Bowers  has
been brought in question by this case, and it should be ad-
dressed.  Its continuance as precedent demeans the lives of ho-
mosexual persons.173
In precisely the same way, Measure 36 demeans the lives of
homosexuals.  While it must be acknowledged that there is a dif-
ference between criminalizing a given behavior and refusing to
legally recognize a given relationship, the restrictions bring iden-
tical normative impacts to bear.  The formal legal effect of Mea-
sure 36 is to prohibit the individual choice to marry a same-sex
partner.  Yet, precisely like the law struck down in Lawrence ,
Measure 36 operates in a broader social context as a vehicle of
subjugation, aimed singly and directly at homosexual individuals.
It effectively deprives such individuals of the choice to marry at
all, if one accepts that most people do not consider the choice to
marry a partner counter to their sexual orientation a legitimate
choice.  And in so doing, Measure 36 effectively stands for the
proposition that homosexual individuals are second-class citi-
zens, either less capable or less worthy of partaking in the consti-
tutionally protected institution of marriage.  In short, it too “is an
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both
in the public and in the private spheres.”174
It should be noted that the Court had the opportunity to deter-
mine the fate of the statute at issue in Lawrence  under the Equal
Protection Clause,175  and that Justice O’Connor’s concurrence
specifically relied on equal protection jurisprudence to find the
statute unconstitutional.176  While recognizing “a tenable argu-
ment”177 for doing so, the majority instead relied on substantive
due process analysis to strike the statute down.178  That decision
reveals the Court’s paramount concern with protecting the con-
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.  (noting that the petitioners pressed an equal protection argument as alter-
native grounds for finding the statute unconstitutional).
176 See id.  at 579-81 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
177 Id.  at 574 (majority opinion).
178 See id.  at 578 (“The State cannot demean [petitioners’] existence or control
their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.  Their right to liberty
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stitutional boundaries of individual liberty, rather than determin-
ing whether a heavy-handed attack on personal autonomy
applied evenly enough to all to pass constitutional muster.  As
the Court explained, “[e]quality of treatment and the due process
right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive
guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects.”179  They
are not, however, coextensive.  And while the doctrines intersect
in certain places, substantive due process reflects a more delicate
appreciation of the soul’s right to breathe, rather than asking
whether all are being suffocated equally.  For when “protected
conduct is made criminal and the law which does so remains
unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain
even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection rea-
sons.”180  Thus, striking a law that irrationally discriminates
against homosexual individuals merely because it does not ex-
tend to heterosexuals does little to avenge the individual liberty
lying at the heart of substantive due process.181  However, sub-
stantive due process analysis avoids this consequence, exposing
the stigmatic effect of laws such as Measure 36 by requiring an
affirmative showing of their substantive validity.  After Law-
rence , when intended to differentiate individuals based merely
upon the State’s moral disapproval of their actions or associa-
tions, such laws and their stigmatic effects come at a price too
steep to constitutionally bear.
IV
GAUGING INTEREST:  IS THERE A LEGITIMATE REASON TO
PROHIBIT SAME-SEX MARRIAGE?
A final critical component of the Lawrence  analysis is the
Court’s application of substantive due process to protect the indi-
vidual right to liberty and autonomy in private sexual conduct,
without resort to strict scrutiny or the pronouncement of a “new”
fundamental right.  Yet even had the Court couched the liberty at
stake in terms of a “fundamental right,” it does not seem to me
under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct
without intervention of the government.”).
179 Id.  at 575.
180 Id.
181 See id.  (“Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause some might question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differ-
ently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and different-sex
participants.”).
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that the Court would have been creating a “new” category of
fundamental right, so much as recognizing a new expression of
an already deeply embedded fundamental right.  In extending
constitutional protection and legitimization to the intimacies of
homosexual relationships for the first time, the Court did not
treat the liberty being protected as a newly created interest, but
rather as part of the personal autonomy protected by existing
substantive due process jurisprudence.182  While the majority
opinion did not explicitly discuss the applicable standard of re-
view, it seems evident that the Court conducted its analysis under
the rational basis standard,183 concluding that the individual right
of consenting adults to engage in private sexual activity is pro-
tected by substantive due process, and that the State has no legit-
imate interest in prohibiting such conduct merely because it
considers it immoral.
I have argued that the fundamental right to marry guaranteed
by the United States Constitution as a matter of substantive due
process necessarily includes the fundamental right to choose
whom to marry, and should be recognized as extending to indi-
viduals in same-sex relationships.  However, even should the
Court decline to apply strict scrutiny to state-contrived prohibi-
tions on same-sex marriage, the rational basis standard still re-
quires the State to make an affirmative showing of “the relation
between the classification adopted and the object to be at-
tained.”184  And Lawrence helps provide the proper scope under
which to consider the interests proffered by the State in support
182 See id.  at 578 (stating that the right of homosexual couples to liberty gives
them the full right to engage in private sexual conduct free from government inter-
vention, because “[i]t is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of per-
sonal liberty which the government may not enter.”) (quoting Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)).
183 Id.  (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”). See also id.  at 580
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the Court has applied “a more searching
form” of rational basis review to laws that exhibit a desire to harm a politically
unpopular group than to run-of-the-mill economic legislation, and stating that the
Court has been most likely to invalidate laws under rational basis review when “the
challenged legislation inhibits personal relationships”).
184 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).  In striking down on equal protec-
tion grounds an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited all state
action designed to provide homosexual or bisexual persons with a claim to any mi-
nority status, quota preference, protected status, or claim of discrimination, the
Court found the law supported by no legitimate state interest, and found rather that
it raised an “inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity
toward the class of persons affected.” Id.  at 634.
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of depriving homosexual individuals of the constitutionally pro-
tected right to choose marriage. The argument here is not that
the Lawrence analysis applies seamlessly to the constitutional
questions raised by Measure 36.  Rather, the argument is that an
analysis must be provided, and that for Measure 36 to survive
even rational basis review, a legitimate state interest must be
shown.
A. Tradition: One Man, One Woman, One Tired Refrain
This line of argument relies upon strict definitional exclusions:
any relationship that is not entered into by one man and one wo-
man is not a marriage.185  Thus, whatever other label may attach
to a same-sex relationship, the individuals can never marry each
other, because a marriage requires one member of each sex.  The
circularity of the logic is apparent.  And this line of attack is not
so much an argument advancing a legitimate state interest as it is
an exercise in tautology, for the institution of marriage is always
defined by those who may access it.  For example, before Loving ,
marriage could have been defined as the union of one man and
one woman of a common race.  The simple point is that such tau-
tological definitional exclusions reveal nothing about the sub-
stantive nature of the right to marry, and serve merely to skirt
the issue of same-sex marriage by stating what is, rather than of-
fering an analysis of why.  Further, such reflexive dismissal of the
arguments in favor of recognizing the right of homosexual indi-
viduals to marry the person of their choice is inconsistent with
our jurisprudential tradition.  A colorable constitutional claim,
even an unpopular one, is entitled to fair and considerate review.
For example, in passing upon whether the State could prohibit
polygamy, the Tenth Circuit did not merely say that since mar-
riage is a union of one man and one woman no further inquiry
was required.  Instead, the court considered the issues presented
and the competing claims before concluding that the state has a
compelling interest in prohibiting plural marriage.186
185 See, e.g. , Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (rejecting
a lesbian couple’s challenge to state marriage statutes on the ground that, because
each party to the relationship was a woman, “the relationship proposed by the ap-
pellants does not authorize the issuance of a marriage license because what they
propose is not a marriage”).
186 See  Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1985).  In addition to
refusing to resort to the mere tautology of the “one man-one woman” marriage
argument, the court there also refused to treat the Supreme Court’s decision in
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Again, the argument is not that the analysis applied to polyga-
mous marriage is the appropriate analysis under which to con-
sider prohibitions on same-sex marriage.  The argument is rather
that an analysis, apart from tautological conclusions, must be
offered.
Closely related to the strictly definitional line of argument is
the argument that same-sex marriage may be prohibited because
marriage has historically encompassed only heterosexual un-
ions.187  In the light cast by Lawrence  on the permissibility of
relying strictly on traditional notions of constitutional rights,188
the fact that marriage has historically included only those rela-
tionships composed of one man and one woman is not a state
interest sufficient to support Measure 36.189  Moreover, reliance
need not be placed on Lawrence  to reveal the infirmities with
this argument.  It should be remembered that the prohibitions on
interracial marriage struck down in Loving190 “arose as an inci-
dent to slavery and [had] been common in Virginia since the co-
lonial period.”191  Yet that long-standing subjugation of the
fundamental right to choose marriage could not answer the bell
as a legitimate reason for continued deprivation.  Neither should
reference to history, alone, suffice as a legitimate state interest to
continue depriving homosexual individuals of the deeply per-
sonal choice to enter into marriage.
Reynolds v. United States , 98 U.S. 145 (1878), upholding the criminal conviction of a
Mormon for practicing polygamy, as dispositive.  Rather, the Potter  court consid-
ered the plaintiff’s claim that Reynolds  was no longer controlling before offering an
analysis of why it disagreed. Id. at 1068-70.
187 See, e.g. , Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (denying chal-
lenge to same-sex marriage prohibition in part because “[t]he institution of marriage
as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of
children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis”).
188 See  539 U.S. at 571-72 (“[W]e think that our laws and traditions in the past
half century are of most relevance here.  These references show an emerging aware-
ness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”); see also id.  at 572 (“His-
tory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the
substantive due process inquiry.” (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
189 See id.  at 577 (“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has tradition-
ally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a
law prohibiting the practice.” (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting))).
190 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
191 Id.  at 6. See supra  note 51.
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B. Promoting Procreation and Child Rearing
There can be little doubt that the State has a critical interest in
encouraging the propagation of its members and ensuring that
the current generation carry forward through future generations.
It is also true that the state interest in promoting procreation has
often been considered intertwined with marriage.192  However,
the argument that a prohibition on same-sex marriage advances
the state’s distinct interest in promoting procreation is fraught
with holes.
To begin, no State has ever required proof of the physical abil-
ity to procreate, or a promise to do so,193 before granting entry
into marriage.194  Secondly, Griswold ,195 Zablocki ,196 and Tur-
ner197 make clear as a matter of constitutional law that procrea-
tion is neither a condition precedent to, nor required outcome of,
entering marriage.  Furthermore, that marriage and procreation
are distinctly different considerations is illustrated by the fact
that, as Justice Scalia notes in his dissenting opinion in Lawrence ,
“the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry.”198  In addition
to that reality, the attenuation between marriage and procreation
is illustrated by the fact that not all couples who produce children
are required to marry one another.
Yet even if having and raising children were an indispensable
component of marriage, same-sex couples could not be prohib-
ited from marrying on that basis.  While it is true that only oppo-
site-sex couples can procreate through sexual intercourse, same-
192 See  Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.  Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“Mar-
riage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing the importance of
the right “to marry, establish a home and bring up children”).
193 Granting marriage licenses contingent on such a promise would obviously
raise serious constitutional problems. See  Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-88
(1978) (explaining that while “reasonable regulations that do not significantly inter-
fere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may be legitimately im-
posed,” significant interference with the exercise of a fundamental right “cannot be
upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely
tailored to effectuate only those interests”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485-86 (1965) (“Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?  The very idea is repulsive
to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”).
194 See, e.g. , M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (uphold-
ing marriage to a transsexual despite his sterility).
195 381 U.S. 479.
196 434 U.S. 374.
197 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
198 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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sex couples can and do choose to have children through adoption
or assisted reproduction.  Furthermore, these options are like-
wise open to opposite-sex couples, meaning that sexual inter-
course, or “natural procreation,” is no longer required for any
couple who wishes to have children.  With this as the current
state of play, it is difficult to understand how imposing absolute
prohibitions on same-sex marriage in any way advances the
State’s interest in promoting procreation.199
In its groundbreaking decision ordering the unfettered exten-
sion of marriage to same-sex couples, Goodridge v. Department
of Public Health ,200 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
recognized as much.  Rejecting the State’s argument that prohib-
iting same-sex couples from marrying is justified by an interest in
“providing a favorable setting for procreation,” the court an-
swered the trial court’s holding that the primary purpose of mar-
riage is procreation with a simple three-word rejoinder:  “This is
incorrect.”201  Despite the fact that many married couples do
have children together, that is not the feature of the relationship
upon which the fundamental interest hinges.  Rather, “it is the
exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage partners
to one another, not the begetting of children, that is the sine qua
non of civil marriage.”202  The court also considered the various
family combinations that raise children with the State’s benedic-
tion, noting that the State “affirmatively facilitates bringing chil-
dren into a family regardless of whether the intended parent is
married or unmarried, whether the child is adopted or born into
a family, whether assistive technology was used to conceive the
child, and whether the parent or her partner is heterosexual, ho-
mosexual, or bisexual.”203
For those reasons, the court held that prohibiting same-sex
199 The fallacy of the argument may be most clearly stated in commonsense terms.
How many opposite-sex couples are going to quit engaging in sexual intercourse, or
decide not to adopt a child, if same-sex couples are allowed to marry?  In the same
connection, how many homosexual individuals are going to suddenly begin engaging
in heterosexual intercourse because they are not allowed to marry the partner of
their choosing?  The answer, on both counts, I suspect is very few.
200 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
201 Id.  at 961.  The court went on to state that such a position was untenable be-
cause the state’s marriage statutes “do not privilege procreative heterosexual inter-
course between married people above every other form of adult intimacy and every
other means of creating a family.” Id.
202 Id.
203 Id.  at 962.
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marriage is not rationally related to the State’s interest in creat-
ing a “favorable setting for procreation.”204 Similarly, the Good-
ridge  court exposed the fallacies of another state interest
commonly proffered to justify prohibitions on same-sex mar-
riage:  Protecting children and promoting their well-being.
Rejecting the State’s argument that confining marriage to op-
posite-sex couples ensures an “optimal” setting for raising chil-
dren, the court recognized that “[p]rotecting the welfare of
children is a paramount State policy,” but also that prohibiting
same-sex marriage “cannot plausibly further this policy.”205  To
begin, the State made no showing that forbidding marriage to
individuals of the same sex would increase the number of individ-
uals choosing to marry opposite-sex partners in order to have
and raise children.206  Further, the State conceded that individu-
als in same-sex relationships may be “excellent” parents.207  And,
while “[e]xcluding same-sex couples from civil marriage will not
make children of opposite-sex marriages more secure,”208 the
“task of child rearing for same-sex couples is made infinitely
harder by their status as outliers to the marriage laws.”209
Rejecting the justifications offered by the State, the Goodridge
court found that the prohibition on same-sex marriage served to
further no legitimate state interest and thus violated the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Massachusetts Consti-
tution.210  In so holding, the court echoed themes running deep
through Supreme Court jurisprudence, including the critical na-
ture of the bilateral commitment protected by the right to
marry211 and the clear distinction between marriage and procrea-
tion.212  It also stepped out into uncharted waters, legalizing in
full same-sex marriage as of May 2004 for the first time in an
American jurisdiction.213
204 Id.  at 961 (“[W]e conclude that the marriage ban does not meet the rational
basis test for either due process or equal protection [under the Massachusetts
Constitution].”).
205 Id.  at 962.
206 Id.  at 963.
207 Id.
208 Id.  at 964.
209 Id.  at 963.
210 See supra  note 204.
211 Goodridge , 798 N.E.2d at 954-55.
212 Id.  at 962 (“If procreation were a necessary component of civil marriage, our
statutes would draw a tighter circle around the permissible bounds of nonmarital
child bearing and the creation of families by noncoital means.”).
213 As a matter of remedy for the constitutional violations, the court did not order
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C. Promotion of Stability and Protection of the Family
One final category of argument advanced against same-sex
marriage is an ill-defined but volubly-made claim that recogniz-
ing the right of homosexual individuals to marry one another will
serve to debase and destabilize society.  It is clear that the State
has an important interest in creating and maintaining a stable so-
ciety, the elemental component of which is the family, the basic
structure of which is most often provided by marriage.  What is
unclear is how recognizing same-sex marriages would serve to
undermine the family or the integrity of the institution of mar-
riage.214  Rather, because marriage serves as a stabilizing force in
the establishment and continuity of families, extending the bene-
fits and protections of marriage to same-sex couples and their
children would serve only to foster social stability, as opposed to
immediate issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples, but rather stayed judg-
ment for 180 days to allow the legislature to “take such action as it may deem appro-
priate” in light of the court’s opinion. Id.  at 970.  The court clarified its holding in
February 2004, announcing that only full access to marriage satisfied constitutional
demands.  Rejecting a proposed civil union bill, the court stated:
The history of our nation has demonstrated that separate is seldom, if ever,
equal. . . .  For no rational reason the marriage laws of the Commonwealth
discriminate against a defined class; no amount of tinkering with language
will eradicate that stain.  The [civil union] bill would have the effect of
maintaining and fostering a stigma of exclusion that the Constitution
prohibits.
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, SJC 09163 (Mass. Feb. 4, 2004), available at
http://glad.org/marriage/Goodridge/SJC_Advisory_Opinion_020404.shtml.  The con-
stitutional implications of Goodridge  are significant, not merely because it allows
fully recognized same-sex marriage in an American jurisdiction for the first time, but
also because same-sex couples married in Massachusetts and seeking to have their
marriages recognized in other states will likely be able to bring a full-bore constitu-
tional challenge to the Defense of Marriage Act, under which no state is required to
recognize a same-sex marriage performed in another state. See  28 U.S.C. § 1738C
(2000).  Although Goodridge  breaks new constitutional ground, courts in several
other states have recently gone the opposite direction.  Faced with similar claims and
presented with substantially similar arguments as the Goodridge  court, intermediate
courts of appeal in Arizona and Indiana have instead relied predominantly on the
deferential nature of the rational basis standard to uphold statutory prohibitions on
same-sex marriage. See  Standhart v. Super. Ct., 77 P.3d 451, 464-65 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2003) (applying rational basis standard to reject challenge to prohibition on same-
sex marriage under state constitution’s equal protection clause); Morrison v. Sadler,
821 N.E.2d 15, 31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding under rational basis review that
prohibition of same-sex marriage does not violate state constitution’s equal privi-
leges and immunities clause).
214 For example, there is no evidence that Massachusetts has plunged into a state
of social anarchy or destabilization—with the notable exception of a few days in
October 2004 after the Red Sox won the World Series—since marriage was made
available in full to same-sex couples.
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casting those families into social exclusion and legal
uncertainty.215
A similarly flawed argument in this vein is that opening the
door to allow homosexual individuals to marry necessarily entails
polygamous and incestuous marriage crashing through the door
behind them.  The argument is flawed practically, because each
constitutional claim must necessarily rise or fall on its own mer-
its.  The argument is also flawed logically, because laws that pro-
hibit multiple marital partners or marriage between individuals
within certain degrees of consanguinity involve significantly dif-
ferent questions than the deprivation visited by Measure 36 upon
two competent, unrelated adults who wish to marry.216
The argument that permitting same-sex marriage alone some-
how undermines the institution of marriage is likewise precari-
ous.217  Rather than diminishing a union that is “intimate to the
degree of being sacred,”218 recognizing the right of same-sex
couples to marry only broadens the class of persons who can par-
take of the goodness of marriage, thus furthering the state’s in-
215 As explained by the court in Goodridge :
While establishing the parentage of children as soon as possible is crucial to
the safety and welfare of children, same-sex couples must undergo the
sometimes lengthy and intrusive process of second-parent adoption to es-
tablish their joint parentage.  While the enhanced income provided by mar-
ital benefits is an important source of security and stability for married
couples and their children, those benefits are denied to families headed by
same-sex couples.  While the laws of divorce provide clear and reasonably
predictable guidelines for child support, child custody, and property divi-
sion on dissolution of a marriage, same-sex couples who dissolve their rela-
tionships find themselves and their children in the highly unpredictable
terrain of equity jurisdiction.
798 N.E.2d at 963 (citations omitted).
216 For example, incestuous marriages implicate legitimate state interests in pro-
tecting public health, including the genetic complications suffered by children born
to parents of close blood relationship.  Polygamous marriages implicate the legiti-
mate state interest in maintaining order in conferring marital benefits, such as intes-
tate succession, based on a two-party relationship. See generally  Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (describing marriage as “an association that
promotes . . . a bilateral loyalty”).
217 In light of inmates’ right to choose marriage protected by Turner v. Safley , 482
U.S. 78 (1987), one can’t help but wonder how admitting same-sex couples into the
“club” of those who may choose marriage diminishes the institution.  On the one
hand, individuals whose choices and behavior are personally and socially destruc-
tive, and whose confinement leaves little room at all for exercise of individual will,
are still free to choose marriage.  On the other hand, individuals across the social
spectrum are prohibited from making the free choice of marriage, based solely on a
minority sexual orientation.
218 Griswold , 381 U.S. at 486.
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terest in the happiness and fulfillment of its citizens.219  As the
Goodridge court stated:
[T]he plaintiffs seek only to be married, not to undermine the
institution of civil marriage.  They do not want marriage abol-
ished . . . .  Recognizing the right of an individual to marry a
person of the same sex will not diminish the validity or dignity
of opposite-sex marriage, any more than recognizing the right
of an individual to marry a person of a different race devalues
the marriage of a person who marries someone of her own
race.  If anything, extending civil marriage to same-sex couples
reinforces the importance of marriage to individuals and com-
munities.  That same-sex couples are willing to embrace mar-
riage’s solemn obligations of exclusivity, mutual support, and
commitment to one another is a testament to the enduring
place of marriage in our laws and in the human spirit.220
CONCLUSION
Homosexual individuals across Oregon are harmed in very real
ways by Measure 36.  Those who wish to marry are left with a
hollow promise—in violation of the principle laid down in Lov-
ing—that they may marry, just not the person of their choice.
Those who do not wish to marry presently are similarly harmed,
their individual definition of self demeaned by categorical exclu-
sion from the future option of partaking in the most cherished
and intimate social relation.  And those of us who fall outside
these groups are nonetheless affected.  To one degree or another
we are each involved in a social structure permitting the moral
will of the majority to be imposed upon the private choices of the
individual.  Forget what you may have heard about activist
judges.  It is squarely within the Court’s tradition to serve as a
counterweight to prevailing majoritarian views.221  As Justice
Blackmun wrote, dissenting in Bowers :
“[W]e apply the limitations of the Constitution with no fear
that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or
even contrary will disintegrate the social organization . . . .
219 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(“[W]e protect the family because it contributes so powerfully to the happiness of
individuals, not because of a preference for stereotypical households.”).
220 Goodridge , 798 N.E.2d at 965 (citations omitted).
221 See, e.g. , United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)
(noting that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special con-
dition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes or-
dinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry”).
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[Freedom] to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom.  The test of
its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the
heart of the existing order.”  It is precisely because the issue
raised by this case touches the heart of what makes individuals
what they are that we should be especially sensitive to the
rights of those whose choices upset the majority.222
Writing for the Lawrence Court seventeen years later, Justice
Kennedy struck a similar chord:  “[T]imes can blind us to certain
truths and later generations can see that laws once thought nec-
essary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.  As the Constitu-
tion endures, persons in every generation can invoke its
principles in their own search for greater freedom.”223
Here’s hoping that a generation of the near future sees Mea-
sure 36 and its brethren for what they truly are, and lifts their
yoke of oppression in the search for our greater freedom.
222 Bowers , 478 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting W. Va. Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943)).
223 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003).
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